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PENNSYLVANIA RULES GOVERNING THE ALLOCATION OF
RECEIPTS DERIVED BY TRUSTEES FROM SHARES
OF STOCK
ROBERT BRIGHAM

t

The never-ending conflict between life beneficiary and remainderman
over receipts from shares of corporate stock is a perennial source of discussion. For eighty years the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held, and
still holds, a position of leadership in this field of the law.1 During that
period, and particularly within the last ten years under the leadership of
Mr. Chief Justice Kephart, it has refined its general rules by establishing a
large body of principles by which the objectives of the general rules are to
be attained in particular cases. Although the application of the general rules
never has been, and never will be, easy, this process of refinement has been
of real help in mitigating the difficulty of application which is the chief
argument of those who would establish easy, but arbitrary, rules.
The general Pennsylvania rules are, of course, known to all. They
are rules of property,2 and, therefore, they can be changed only by the legislature.' To debate their desirability or undesirability would be merely to
rattle old bones. To plunge into a maze of arithmetic would be tiresome
and unprofitable.
However, the refinements introduced by the recent decisions are as
elusive as they are helpful in a particular case. The supreme court has itself,
in Waterhouse's Estate,4 summarized many of them. Since that decision
there have been further developments and, moreover, the limitations of a
single opinion necessarily prevented a discussion of all phases of the subject.
For these reasons it seems not out of place at this time to correlate the
familiar general rules with the less familiar principles governing their application, avoiding purely academic discussion on the one hand and tedious
arithmetic on the other.
t B. A., 1921, Yale; LL.B., 1929, University of Pennsylvania; member of the Philadelphia Bar.
I. The rules originally established by that court are the basis of RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS
(1935) § 236, and are known as the "Pennsylvania" or "American" rules. The Restatement,
however, denies the right of the life beneficiary to participate in certain cases where, as will
be pointed out, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania now accords him that right.
2. Maris's Estate, 301 Pa. 2o, 24, 151 Atl. 577, 578 (193o) ; Harkness's Estate, 283 Pa.
464, 466, 467, 129 Atl. 458, 459 (1925).
3. Stokes' Estate (No. i), 24o Pa. 277, 282, 87 Atl. 971, 973 (1913). Consequently, the

Pennsylvania courts cannot be expected to follow the Restatement in cases where the latter is
not in accord with the Pennsylvania decisions. See the statement of Mr. Chief Justice Kephart before the American Law Institute on May 5, 1933. I1 PRoc. Am. L. INST. 196-200
(1933).

4. 308 Pa. 422, 162 Atl. 295 (1932).
(358)
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Assuming that the trust is one to which the general Pennsylvania rules
of apportionment apply, 5 it makes no difference that the estate is still in the
hands of the executor and has not yet been awarded to the trustee,6 nor is it
material whether the gift to the remaindermen is specific, demonstrative or
general. 7 In applying the rules the court will tend to favor the life beneficiaries, at least when they are the widow and children of the creator of the
trust," for whom he might be expected to have more regard than for unborn
or unascertained remaindermen. And in no event will the rights of the life
beneficiaries be affected by the decisions of the federal courts in income tax
cases,9 or by the accounting requirements of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 10 or by the provisions of the National Banking Act prohibiting
stock dividends.'1
Even the intention of the creator of the trust is subject to limitations.
That intent, if expressed, will govern so far as it is legal.' 2 Although the
creator of the trust may give the life beneficiary more than the application
of the Pennsylvania rules would give him,' 8 he cannot give the life beneficiary less. A direction to keep in corpus what would normally be awarded
as income is subject to the statute against accumulations and will be stricken
down, 14 unless the particular accumulation is authorized by that statute.
5. They may not apply at all where a testator who died prior to June 7, I917, created a
legal life estate, rather than a trust, in shares of stock. In such a case, the life beneficiary
must enter security for the protection of the remaindermen unless the will stipulated to the
contrary. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 2770; Act of May 17, 1871, P. L. 269, § i.
On the entry of security, the life beneficiary became the absolute owner of the shares and was
merely the debtor of the remaindermen for their value. The life beneficiary in such a case is
absolutely entitled to any dividends or profits that might be realized. Letterle's Estate, 248
Pa. 95, 93 Atl. 935 (1915) ; Kirkpatrick's Estate, 284 Pa. 583, 131 Atl. 361 (1925). If the
life beneficiary, being required to enter security, did not do so, the court would appoint a
trustee to hold the property. If such appointment was made upon petition of the life beneficiary alone, the result is the same as though security had been entered. Weir's Estate, 251
Pa. 499, 96 Atl. io86 (I916). In such a case all dividends and profits would apparently belong to the life beneficiary and no question of apportionment would arise. If, however, both
life beneficiary and remaindermen joined in the application for the appointment of a trustee, the
shares would be held in trust for all purposes, just as though the testator had himself created
the trust. Loewer's Estate, 263 Pa. 517, io6 At. 789 (1919). See Veech's Estate, 74 Pa.
Super. 373 (1920), in which court and counsel treated the trust as though it had been created
by the testator. This question probably would not arise where the testator died on or after
June 7, 1917. Such a trust would be governed by § 23 of the Fiduciaries Act, effective that
date. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 20, § 635. The ordinary rules of apportionment
would probably apply to a trust set up under the provisions of that act, although it should be
noted that the trustee would have no authority to retain shares of corporate stock.
6. Flinn's Estate, 3io Pa. 2o6, 211, 165 AtI. 31, 33 (1932).
7. Flaccus's Estate, 283 Pa. 185, 129 Atl. 74 (1925).
8. Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa. 455, 459, 179 Atl. 729, 732 (I935).
9. Harkness's Estate, 283 Pa. 464, 129 Atl. 458 (1925).
io. Cassatt's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 14, 158 Atl. 586 (1932).
ii. Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278, 280, 105 Atl. 273, 274 (i918).
12. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, i56, 14o Atl. 862, 864 (1928) ; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 236, comment b.
13. E. g., Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481, 67 At. 775 (1907).
14. Maris's Estate, 301 Pa. 20, 15r Atl. 577 (930).
Contra: Equitable Trust Co. v.

Prentice, 250 N. Y. i, 164 N. E. 723 (1928).

See Note (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 336.

The Pennsylvania statute prohibiting accumulations is found in PA.
1930) tit. 20,

§ 3251.

STAT. ANN.

(Purdon,
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The occasion for an apportionment may be furnished either by an act
of the corporation whose shares are held by the trustee or by an act taking
place wholly within the trust estate. The corporation may declare a dividend or issue rights to subscribe to additional shares, or it may go into
total or partial liquidation or merge with another corporation. Even though
the corporation has done nothing, an apportionment may become necessary
because the trustee has sold the shares at a profit. However, unless there
is some act, either by the corporation or within the trust estate, there is no
occasion for an apportionment so long as the trustee merely continues to
hold the shares. 15
Although the general rules differ in certain important respects, principally as to the burden of proof, depending upon the particular occasion
which makes an apportionment necessary, the object of the Pennsylvania
rule is to give the life beneficiary all earnings which have been accumulated
by the corporation during the period when the shares were held in the trust,
provided that the intact value of the investment is not thereby impaired.
These two concepts, namely, intact value and earnings, are encountered in
every apportionment, and it is in their development that the recent decisions
assume such great importance. 16 A thorough analysis of these concepts
will make it possible to treat very briefly the more familiar general rules
which determine when the life beneficiary is, and when he is not, entitled to
an apportionment.
In order to simplify the discussion as much as possible, the rules will
be stated in terms of a testamentary trust, although the same rules apply to
a trust created by deed or declaration. We shall therefore speak of the
creator of the trust simply as "the testator", which term should also be
understood to include a settlor of an inter vivos trust. Again, the period
during which the shares were held in the trust may commence with the
death of the testator or execution of the trust instrument, if the shares were
received from the creator of the trust, or it may commence with the subsequent acquisition of the shares by the trustee, as the case may be. In order
to avoid frequent repetition of this enumeration, the commencement of this
period will be referred to simply as the death of the testator, which term
should be understood to include the others. Finally, the person entitled to
the income of the estate will be referred to as the "life beneficiary", although
he may in fact be a tenant for years or a tenant pur autre vie.
15. Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 543, 147 Atl. 6o6, 6o8 (1929) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290
Pa. 457, 477, 479, 139 Atl. 200, 208 (1927) ; cf. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 236 (e) and
comment y.

16. It is at this point, also, that one gets little or no help from RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,
§ 236, and the comments thereto, or from most of the vast amount of discussion which has
been devoted to this field of law.
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THE

DETERMINATION

OF INTACT VALUE

The term intact value has been defined as that value which must be
preserved for corpus. 1" Until very recently there was a great deal of doubt
as to the determination of that value. Although some of the earlier cases used
the market value of the shares,' and others said that market value may aid
in the determination,' 9 it is now settled that intact value is not market
value. 20 Likewise, it is now settled that neither appraised nor inventory
value, although formerly used, 21 is the intact value. 22 Other earlier cases
23
have mentioned "actual", "real", or "intrinsic" value.
At present most of this confusion has been set definitely at rest. Prima
facie, intact value is the "book value" of the shares, 24 calculated as of the
date either of the testator's death, 5 if he owned the shares, or of their
acquisition by the trustees 2 6 if acquired in any manner other than by purchase. Where different lots of shares were acquired at different times, the
intact value is prima facie the sum of the intact values of each lot calculated
27
as of the date of its acquisition.
Book value is, of course, merely the value which each share is shown
to have at that time by the books of the corporation. Generally speaking,
28
that value is the par value plus earnings accumulated up to that time.
More simply stated, it is the capital and surplus divided by the number of
29
shares outstanding at that date.
However, there is an inconsistency which has crept into the recent
cases. If the trustee acquired the shares from the testator, their book value
17.

Waterhouse's Estate, 3o8 Pa.

422, 427,

162 Atl.

295,

296 (1932).

18. Philadelphia Trust, Safe-Deposit & Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 24 W. N. Cas. 137, 16 Ati. 734

(Pa. 1889) ; Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).

19. Stokes' Estate (No. 2), 240 Pa. 288, 291, 87 Atl. 975, 976 (1913) ; Boyer's Appeal,
224 Pa. 144, 152, 73 Atl. 320, 322 (19o9) ; Smith's Estate, 14o Pa. 344, 357, 21 Atl. 438, 44o

(1891).
20. Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. 39, 42, 148 AtI. 907, 9o8 (193o) ; Jones v. Integrity Trust Co.,
292 Pa. 149, 155, 14o Atl. 862, 864 (1928) ; Packer's Estate (No. I), 291 Pa. 194, 196, 139
Ati. 867 (1927) ; Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 455, 132 Atl. 352, 353 (1926).
21. Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 133 Atl. 562 (1926); Quay's Estate, 253 Pa. So,

97 Atl.

1029 (I916).

22. Flinn's Estate, 310 Pa. 2o6, 209, 165 At. 31, 32 (1932).
23. Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. at 455, 132 Atl. at 353; Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. 491,
496, 124 Ati. 166, 168 (1924) ; Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. at 152, 73 At. at 322; Smith's Estate,
140 Pa. at 357, 21 Atl. at 44o; Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit and Insurance Company's
Appeal, 24 W. N. Cas. 137, 16 Atl. 734; Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264, 271 (1877).
24. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 427, 162 Atl. at 296; Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. at 42,

148 Atl. at 908. See also Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352; Mallory's Estate, 285
Pa. 186, 131 Atl. 714 (1926) ; McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, io6 At. i89 (1919) ; Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278, 1O5 Atl. 273 (ii8), for earlier cases in which book value was used.
25. Flinn's Estate, 310 Pa. at 2IO, 165 Atl. at 32; Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. at 42, 148 At.

at oS.
26. Flinn's Estate, 310 Pa. at 211, 165 At. at 33 (shares received from another corporation and later sold at a profit) ; Bullitt's Estate, 308 Pa. 413, 162 Atl. 288 (1932) (shares
donated by life beneficiaries).
27. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. at 152, 14o Atl. at 863.

28. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 427, 162 Atl. at 296; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. at
464, 139 Atl. at 203.
29. Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. at 191, 131 Atl. at 715.
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is prima facie their intact value. 30 If, on the other hand, the trustee purchased the shares, the cases indicate that the purchase price, and not the book
81
The purchase price is
value at the date of purchase, is the intact value.
of course merely the market value and therefore, in this one instance, intact
values are actually determined by market values, in spite of the reiterated
32
Perhaps
statements that market value has nothing to do with intact value.
this result, although logically inconsistent, does substantial justice, because
the trustee has actually paid out money and because this expenditure should
be preserved for the remaindermen. Otherwise, it might not be preserved
if, as is frequently the case, the shares were purchased at a price in excess
of their book value.
In calculating the book value in order to make a prima facie determination of intact value, it usually happens that the testator's death did not
coincide with the termination of an accounting year of the corporation.
When the testator dies in the middle of an accounting year, it is usually
impossible to secure a balance sheet as of the day of the testator's death.
For this reason it has been customary to calculate the surplus on the testator's
death by averaging the earnings of the corporation for that year on a per
day basis and adding the amount thus obtained to the surplus shown by the
last balance sheet prior to the testator's death. This practice has been sanctioned recently by the supreme court.3 3 It should not be followed, however,
except in cases of necessity, for "averaging is not allowed when definite
34
figures can be obtained".
As has been noted, the book value is not conclusive as to the intact
value. Nevertheless, the corporate books are presumed to have been kept
in good faith, 35 and the burden of proof rests upon the person asserting a
higher or lower value than that shown by the books. 30 The evidence must
be of a character to leave no doubt that a mistake has been made, or that
fraud has been committed.3 7 Although a general reappraisal of the assets
of the corporation will not be permitted, 38 the real values of assets carried
at nominal amounts may be shown.3 9 If the corporation is a mining or
other "wasting assets corporation", the necessity of proving that adequate
reserves for depletion were maintained depends on who has the burden of
proof. If the remaindermen must prove an impairment of intact value, 'it
3o. See cases collected supra notes

24 and 25.
31. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 181 Atl. 567 (1935) ; Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292
Pa. at 153, 14o Atl. at 864.
32. See cases collected supra note 20.
33. Flinn's Estate, 31o Pa. at 212, 165 Atl. at 33.
34. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. at 152, 14o Atl. at 863.
35. Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. at 42, 148 Atl. at 9o8.
36. Waterhouse's Estate, 3o8 Pa. at 428, 162 Atl. at 296; Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. at 42,
r48 Atl. at 9o8.
37. Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. at 42, 148 At. at 9o8.
38. Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. at 496, 124 Atl. at 167.
39. Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. at 43, 148 At!. at 9o9.
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will be presumed that the reserves are adequate, unless the contrary is
shown; but if the life beneficiary must prove that intact value is not impaired, he should offer affirmative evidence as to reserves for depletion. 40
Corporations frequently make changes on their books in order to correct previous entries. If in the interim the testator died, the books, as
they existed at his death, would not present a correct picture. Where the
corporation recognizes this by a later change in the books, the intact value
should be corrected. Thus, where the corporation, after the testator's death,
restores excess depreciation that has been charged off in previous years,
such excess depredation up to the death of the testator may be added to the
intact value.4 1 On the other hand, where the corporation writes off an
item of "good will" prior to the testator's death and restores it thereafter,
the court has refused to allow the restored "good will" to -be added to the
intact value of the shares. 2 The latter result was caused by the fact that
the court apparently regarded the item "good will" as having been at all
times fictitious, at least in the case then before it.
Another type of correction of intact value may be made necessary by
a condition which, although existing at the death of the testator, does not
manifest itself upon the books of the corporation until a later date. For
example, the corporation was engaged, at the testator's death, in performing
a large contract but did not then carry the contract as an asset on its books
because it was uncertain whether it would ultimately result in a profit or a
loss. In fact it resulted in a large profit. The court held that this profit
must be added to the book value of the shares as of the testator's death in
order to ascertain the intact value. 48 If the contract had resulted in a loss,
the amount thereof would have been subtracted. 44 It is believed that this
case presents an unusual situation by reason of the extraordinary size of
the contract involved. If this case announces a rule of general application,
the door is thrown open to an analysis of a myriad of ordinary transactions,
started before the death of the testator, in order to determine whether they
resulted in profits or losses thereafter. Such a result would place an intolerable burden upon the person who had the burden of proving what the
intact value was.
Changes in intact value may also be made necessary by reason of
events occurring subsequent to the death of the testator. These may be
either (i) events which occur within the corporation or (2) events which
ot

4o. Compare Harkness's Estate, 5 D. & C. 351, 352, 353 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1924), aff'd
other Points, 283 Pa. 464, 129 Atl. 458 (1925), in which the burden was on the remain-

derman, with McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, 83, io6 Atl. i89, 19o (I919), in which the life
beneficiaries produced affirmative evidence. Cf. RESTATEaFENT, TUSTS, § 236, comment z.
41. Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. at 44, 148 Atl. at 9o9.
42. Baird's Estate, 299 Pa. at 43, 148 Atl. at 909.
43. Flinn's Estate, 320 Pa. 15, 181 Atl. 492 (1935).
44. Flinn's Estate, 320 Pa. at 23, 181 At. at 495.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

occur within the trust estate. They may cause either an increase or a decrease in intact value.
If the shareholders make additional payments to the corporation, this
"contributed" or "paid-in" surplus increases the intact value of the shares.4 5
Likewise, if the corporation sells new shares at a price in excess of the book
value of such shares, the intact value of all of the shares is increased thereby.46 It has been stated broadly that any increase in surplus not attributable
to earnings is an increase of intact valueY Whether profits realized from
the sale of property are earnings or whether they are increases in intact
value is a question, the answer to which is not at this time settled. It will
be the subject of detailed discussion in considering the nature of earnings. 48
The intact value of the shares may be decreased by any "capital loss"
sustained by the corporation. 49 A sale of new shares by the corporation at a
price below their book value would decrease, of course, the intact value of
all of the shares.5" The nature of so-called "capital losses" has not been
made clear by the decisions of the supreme court. Such a capital loss was
expressly considered in only one of them, namely, Dickinson's Estate,51
where the court considered the effect of a very large loss, sustained by a
fire insurance company and caused by a conflagration. In that case the loss
was so great in amount that it not only wiped out the surplus of the corporation but also caused an impairment in capital. The court held that the
result was to reduce the intact value to the book value of the shares after
the loss had been charged off. The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia requires such losses to be deducted first from earnings accumulated since the
death of the testator, and only the balance of the loss, if any, may be deducted from intact value. 52 This is a literal application of the rule of
Dickinsoies Estate, but it results in making the rights of the parties depend
entirely upon the magnitude of the loss rather than upon its nature. In
Dickinson's Estate the court really had before it an operating loss of such
magnitude that some of it, perforce, had to be borne by the intact value.
If there is any real foundation for the concept of "capital losses", their
incidence should depend not upon their size but upon their character. It
45. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 428, 162 Ati. at 296; Packer's Estate (No. I), 291
Pa. at 197, 139 Atl. 867; Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. at 453, 132 AtL. at 353.
46. Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352; Willcox's Estate, 66 Pa. Super. 182,
190 (1917).
47. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 428, 162 Atl. at 296. Under this rule, the proceeds
of an insurance policy on the life of a deceased officer would become a part of intact value.
Jones v. Motor Sales Co., 322 Pa. 492, 185 Atl. 8o9 (1936).
48. Ilara pp. 366 to 369.

49. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 428, 162 Atl. at 296; Packer's Estate (No. I), 291
Pa. at 197, 139 Atl. 867; Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. at 464, 139 Atl. at 203; Dickinson's
Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352.
5o. Willcox's Estate, 66 Pa. Super. at x9o.
5r. Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352 (1926).
52. Neafie's Estate, 25 D. & C. 6o8, 617 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1936).
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may be suggested that the only true "capital losses" are decreases in book
value caused by financing operations, losses sustained on assets which were
owned by the corporation at the death of the testator, and losses of similar
character. Likewise, the only true capital gains ought to consist only of
increases in book value caused by transactions of like nature. These are
questions which warrant, and will doubtless receive, further clarification
when suitable cases arise.
Another problem is presented by an intervening merger of corporations.
For example, the trustee holds shares of the X corporation which, after the
death of the testator, purchases all the assets of the Y corporation, which
it treats on its books as having been worth exactly the purchase price. Still
later it becomes necessary to apportion a stock dividend declared by the X
corporation. Presumably, the X corporation does not pay, in cash or stock,
any more than the assets of the Y corporation are worth and consequently,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the merger does not change the
intact value of the outstanding shares of the X corporation.5"
All of the foregoing changes in intact value were caused by events
occurring entirely within the corporation. But similar changes may be
made necessary by events which take place wholly or principally within the
trust estate. For example, the life beneficiaries may, on a previous occasion
for apportionment, have donated to corpus the shares or cash which they
would otherwise have been entitled to receive. This donation may be by express agreement, made the basis of an adjudication,5 4 or it may simply result
because the life beneficiaries were at that time ignorant of their rights.5
In either event, the effect of the donation presents a vexatious problem
when a subsequent occasion for apportionment arises. If the donation consists of shares of stock, the donation merely adds to the intact value a sum
equal to the book value of the donated shares. An adjudication, even though
based upon an express agreement of the parties, does not have the effect of
writing up the intact value of the original shares to the book value of the
donated shares. 56 If, however, the donation consisted of cash, it has no effect
whatever upon the intact value and cannot be considered a payment on ac57
count of that intact value.
It frequently happens that the determination of intact value is further
complicated by the fact that, in the past, the trustee received rights to subscribe which he either exercised or sold. Later there is a stock dividend
(or other occasion for apportionment) and both transactions come before
the court, at which time it is necessary to determine the intact value. The
53. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. at 155, 14o Atl. at 864.
54. Bullitt's Estate, 3o8 Pa. 413, 162 Atl. 288 (932).
55. Neafie's Estate, 25 D. & C. 6o8. This case, however, is now on appeal to the supreme
court.
56. Bullitt's Estate, 308 Pa. 413, 162 Atl. 288.
57. Neafie's Estate, 25 D. & C. 6o8.
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effect upon intact value of the intervening rights to subscribe depends upon
what the trustee did with them. If he exercised them and subscribed to new
shares, paying the subscription price out of principal, the intact value of the
whole investment is the book value of the original shares plus the purchase
price of the new shares. 58 If he exercised the rights but distributed the new
shares to the life beneficiaries, the intact value is unchanged, but the purchase price of the new shares must be taken out of income. 59 If, instead
of exercising the rights, the trustee sold them and now retains the proceeds
as principal, the intact value of the investment is the book value of the
original shares minus the proceeds of the sale of the rights.6 0
The rules just stated may not apply, however, if an adjudication has
intervened between the exercise or sale of the rights to subscribe and the
subsequent occasion for apportionment. If, by reason of a failure to press
their rights, the life beneficiaries allowed the court to award the subscribed
shares (or the proceeds of the sale of rights) entirely to corpus when part
or all should have been awarded to income, apparently there would be a
donation. 61 Upon any subsequent occasion for an apportionment the intact
value would be increased by the book value of any shares of stock donated
to corpus 62 but would be neither increased nor decreased by a cash dona63
tion.
Such are the refinements by which one must determine the intact value
to be preserved for the remaindermen. Similar, but less detailed, refinements determine the nature of earnings which may be awarded to the life
beneficiaries. After consideration of these, we then may discuss briefly
the application of both concepts to the various occasions which call for an
apportionment.
THE NATURE OF EARNINGS

Any fund which does not represent earnings available for distribution
in the form of a dividend 64 should not be treated as earnings for the purpose now under discussion. However, the converse is not necessarily true.
It does not follow that, because a corporation is at liberty to treat a particular fund as earnings or profits available for the declaration of a dividend, such fund constitutes earnings as between life beneficiary and remainderman. 65 Consequently, the bare fact that the surplus of the corporation
58. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 181 Atl. 567; Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. at
153, 14o Atl. at 864.

59. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. at 154, 14o Atl. at 864.
6o. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. at 154, I4O At!. at 864.
61. Neafie's Estate, 25 D. & C. 6o8.
62. Bullitt's Estate, 308 Pa. 413, 162 Atl. 288.
63. Neafie's Estate, 25 D. & C. 6o8.
64. Jones v. Motor Sales Co., 322 Pa. 492, i85 Att. 8o9 (1936) (proceeds of insurance
policy on life of deceased officer).
65. For example, earnings accumulated prior to the death of the testator are part of the
intact value of the shares. See Waterhouse's Estate, 3o8 Pa. at 427, 162 At!. at 296; Nirdlinger's Estate,

290

Pa. at 464, 139 Atl. at 203.
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has increased since the death of the testator does not necessarily indicate
66 For example, profits
that the surplus has been increased out of earnings.
derived by the corporation from the sale of capital assets owned at the death
6 7 And a distribution of corporate property,
of the testator are not earnings.
before the death of the testator, is not a disacquired by the corporation
68
earnings.
of
out
tribution
However, earnings accumulated since the death of the testator do not
lose their character as such merely because the management of the corporation has transferred them to another corporation as a part of an elaborate
6
plan of reorganization or reincorporation, nor do they cease to be earnings
available for the life beneficiary merely because the corporation has invested them in permanent capital assets.70 Consequently, a stock or scrip
72
dividend, 71 or the portion of the proceeds of a sale of the shares, representing capital assets acquired from earnings accumulated since the death of
the testator, should be awarded to the life beneficiary.
This problem is encountered most frequently when it is discovered
that some of the increase in surplus is due to profits made by the corporation from the sale of real estate subsequent to the death of the testator.
Such profits may be considered as earnings, under the foregoing rules, if
the real estate was originally acquired by the corporation out of earnings
accumulated subsequent to the death of the testator. Even though the corporation owned the real estate when the testator died, the profits may still
be earnings if the principal business of the corporation is to deal in real
estate. 73 In all other cases, however, profits derived from the sale of real
estate should be treated as additions to the intact value, rather than as
earnings.
It must not be supposed that earnings are limited to profits derived
from the regular or principal business of the corporation. Earnings also
66. Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 44o, 146 Ati. iii,

112 (1929).

67. Graham's Estate, I98 Pa, 216, 47 Ati. iio8 (1goi) (proceeds of condemnation of
property of corporation) ; Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434 (1882) (proceeds of sale of property
of corporation) ; RESTATEMENT, TRusTs, § 236, comment z.
68. Eisner's Appeal, 175 Pa. 143, 148-149, 34 Atl. 577, 579 (1896).
69. Daily's Estate, 323 Pa. 42, 186 Atl. 754 (1936).
7o. Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 441, 448, 154 Atl. 814, 816 (1931) ; Boyer's Appeal, 224
Pa. 144, 73 Atl. 320 (19o9) ; Cassatt's Estate, 1O5 Pa. Super. 14, 158 Atl. 586 (1932) ; AfcCahan's Estate, 18 D. & C. 171 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1933), rev'd on other points, 312 Pa. 515,

168 Atl. 685 (933)

; see Eisner's Appeal, 175 Pa. at 148-149, 34 Atl. at 579. Accord: RE-

STATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236, comment

z.

71. Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. at 448, 154 Atl. at 816; Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144, 73
Atl. 320. The dictum of the lower court to the contrary printed with the supreme court opinion in Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434, 438 (1882), must now be regarded as overruled.
72. Cassatt's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 14, 158 Atl. 586.
73. Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 371, 133 Atl. 562, 563 (1926) ; see Thomson's Estate, 153 Pa. 332, 26 AtI. 653 (1893) ; Oliver's Estate, 136 Pa. 43, 2o Atl. 527 (89o) (trustee

held interests in an unincorporated association and a joint stock company, instead of shares
of stock of a corporation). Accord: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236, comment z.
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include profits derived from "miscellaneous sources", 74 which, however, are
not specified with any degree of clarity. Thus surplus earnings acquired
through a merger and carried in the surplus account of the corporation
75
which acquired them are earnings of the latter.
One of the "miscellaneous sources" which has caused a certain degree
of confusion is the profit derived by the corporation from the sale of stocks
or bonds of other corporations which it owned. Of course, if the corporation issues its own bonds above par, or issues its own stock at a price above
book value, the gain should not be treated as earnings.76 If, however, it
sells its holdings of securities of another corporation, a different question is
presented.
In Graham's Estate,7 7 the supreme court stated that profits from the
sale of bonds are not income. However, in Chauncey's Estate,78 this statement was in effect retracted. Consequently, the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia has now decided that profits derived from the sale by the corporation of stock of another corporation constitute earnings, even though the
79
securities in question are shares of stock of a wholly owned subsidiary.
In none of these cases has any attention been paid to the fact that some of
the securities were owned by the corporation at the death of the testator. s0
That fact would seem to be of vital importance, however. If the
securities were owned by the corporation at the death of the testator, they
would be part of the intact value, and any profit realized on their subsequent
sale would not be earnings, 8 ' unless the principal business of the corporation
was to deal in such securities.8 2 But if the corporation acquired the securities out of earnings accumulated subsequent to the death of the testator,
any subsequent profits should be treated as earnings. 8 3 Although this distinction apparently has never been urged in any reported case, it is supported nevertheless by authorities specifically dealing with profits realized on
74. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 428, 162 Atl. at 296; Chauncey's Estate, 3o3 Pa. at
448, 154 Atl. at 816; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236, comment v.
75. Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. at 448, 154 Atl. at 86.
76. Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352; Willcox's Estate, 66 Pa. Super. 182,
I9o.

77. io D. & C. 695 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1928), aff'd, 296 Pa. 436, 440, 146 At. II,
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(1929).

78. Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. at 448, 154 At!. at 86.
79. Dobson's Estate, 26 D. & C. 154 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1936) ; cf. McCahan's Estate, I8
D. & C. 171 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1933), rev'd on other points, 32 Pa. 515, i68 Atl. 685 (933).
If such profits are earnings, it would follow that losses would be properly treated as operating
losses, deductible from accumulated earnings, and not capital losses deductible from intact
value. Neafie's Estate, 25 D. & C. 6o8 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1936).
8o. See, e. g., the securities whose sale was involved in Dobson's Estate, 26 D. & C. I54.
8i. Graham's Estate, I98 Pa. 216, 47 AtI. iio8; Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434; cf. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236, comment v, the second sentence of which appears to be inconsistent with the second paragraph of comment z.
82. See cases collected supra note 73.
83. See cases collected vipra notes 70, 72.
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the sale of other so-called "capital assets" by the corporation. As a matter
of logic, therefore, it appears to be sound.
It sometimes happens that a corporation, during the trust period, sets
up a reserve for depreciation in excess of the amount required for that
purpose. This fund, having been established out of earnings which would
otherwise have been available for distribution to the life beneficiary, does
not lose its character as earnings and, if subsequently distributed, should be
84

awarded as income.

Future decisions undoubtedly will give additional aid in determining
what constitutes earnings and what does not. It may also be expected that
further principles for the determination of intact value will be established.
It is believed, however, that the foregoing rules relating to earnings and
to intact value apply regardless of the nature of the particular occasion for
apportionment which the court is considering. However, in some cases
the burden is on the remainderman to show that a particular fund does not
represent earnings, or that its award to the life beneficiary will impair the
intact value of the shares. In other cases, the burden is on the life beneficiary to show that a particular fund does represent earnings accumulated
by the corporation since the creation of the trust and that its award to him
will not impair the intact value of the shares. These differences will be
pointed out in considering the particular occasions which give rise to the
question of apportionment.
DIVmIENDS

By far the most common occasion for controversy between life beneficiary and remainderman is presented by the declaration of a dividend. A
dividend may be "ordinary" or "extraordinary". Indeed, it may partake
of the nature of both.
All dividends paid, out of earnings which accrued to the corporation
after the death of the testator are income, regardless of their amount or
the regularity of their declaration.8 5 While in such a case, therefore, it
generally makes no difference whether the dividend is "ordinary" or "extraordinary", in other cases it becomes very important to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary dividends because the applicable rules are
entirely different.
Ordinary dividends have been variously defined as dividends paid at
customary rates and uniform intervals,"6 as usual or customary dividends
at a fixed sum or rate and paid at regular periods,8 7 or as periodic declara84. McCahan's Estate, 18 D. & C. IM7,rev'd on other points, 312 Pa. 515, 168 At. 685.
85. Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 464, 179 AtI. 729, 734 (1935).
86. Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa. at 461, 464, 179 AtI. at 733, 734; Given's Estate,
323 Pa. 456, 461, 185 AtI. 778, 780 (1936) ;
87. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. at 462, 139 At. at 202.
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tions involving small sums or rates.8 8 An extraordinary dividend has been
defined as a dividend which is unusual in form and amount and paid at
8 9

irregular intervals.

This distinction, which might seem tolerably easy to apply, may nevertheless lead to unexpected difficulty. For example, a corporation has no
fixed or regular dividend policy. From time to time, as profits warrant,
it is in the habit of making distributions to shareholders. These distributions are very substantial in amount but are at no uniform rate. In some
years there will be no distribution at all, and in other years a dividend as
large as thirty-three dollars a share will be paid. In other words, it is the
ordinary practice of the corporation to declare a series of extraordinary
dividends. The auditing judge, to whom this problem was presented, held
that the last of a series of such dividends was "ordinary" but nevertheless
found it impossible to apportion it between the successive life beneficiaries
on a per day basis, as bond interest is apportioned, in accordance with the
requirements of Section 22 of the Fiduciaries Act. 90 The court en banc
reached the same conclusion but said that the dividend belonged to a third
classification, being "not so extraordinary that its source will be inquired
into, and which, therefore, must be called an ordinary dividend, and yet so
irregular that it cannot be apportioned, and must lie where it falls". 9 Consequently, the dividend was awarded to the person entitled to the income
of the estate when the dividend was declared, even though it was paid out
of earnings that had accrued during a prior life estate. The dividend,
therefore, did not come within Section 22 of the Fiduciaries Act, which
lays down the only exception to the general rule that ordinary dividends
are not apportionable and must be awarded to the person then entitled to the
income of the trust estate.9 2 That statute applies only to wills and provides
only for the apportionment of "ordinary" dividends at the end of a life estate
or an estate for years on a per day basis as bond interest is apportioned. 93
In accordance with the general rule, ordinary dividends, if paid out of
earnings, are income even though they were paid out of earnings made by
the corporation prior to the death of the testator. 94 It has been said that
88. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 375 (1857). For additional discussion, see RESTATEMENT,
236, comment c.
89. Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. at 462, 139 Atl. at 202.
9o. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 634.
91. Nirdlinger's Estate, 26 D. & C. 3, 18 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1936).
92. In support of the general rule, see Opperman's Estate (No. i), 319 Pa. 455, 179 At.
729; Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 428, 162 At. at 296; Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. at 462,
478, 139 Atl. at 202, 208; McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. at 86, io6 Atl. at 191; Earp's Appeal,
28 Pa. at 375; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236, comments c-f.
93. It is believed that this is a correct statement of the limited scope of the statute.

TRUSTS, §

Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa. 455, 179 Atl. 729; Given's Estate, 323 Pa. at 461, 185

Atl. at 780; Thompson's Estate, 6 D. & C. 5o3 (Orph. Ct. 1925) ; Nirdlinger's Estate, 26 D.
& C. at 15. Further light on this at present doubtful question may be expected from the decision on the pending appeal in Nirdlinger's Estate.
94. Opperman's Estate (No. i), 319 Pa. 455, 179 Atl. 729; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236,
comment d.
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this rule does not apply when "unusual circumstances" are present. The
court has, however, defined an "unusual circumstance" as being one which
comes from some administrative or corporate act within the corporation
or some breakdown within the corporate structure, rather than a circumstance set up by the fiduciary or by the court.9 5 The relation between the
value of the trustee's holding of a particular stock and the value of the
whole trust estate is not an "unusual circumstance". On the other hand,
where the corporation reduces the number of shares of stock or the par
value of the shares, in order to provide a surplus out of which ordinary
dividends can be paid, this act is an "unusual circumstance" and dividends
paid out of such surplus constitute a return of capital and will be awarded
to principal. 9 6
If an ordinary dividend was declared by the corporation prior to the
death of the testator but made payable at a date subsequent thereto, the
disposition of the dividend depends entirely upon the date fixed by the
dividend resolution for the ascertainment of the shareholders to whom the
dividend shall be paid; if no date is specified, such a dividend is awarded
to corpus. The same is true if the resolution specifies that the dividend
shall be paid to shareholders of record on a date prior to the death of the
testator; but if the resolution directs that the dividend be paid to shareholders of record on a date subsequent to the death of the testator, the
97
dividend is awarded in its entirety to income.
The rules with respect to extraordinary dividends are entirely different. The prima facie presumption is that every such dividend was declared
out of earnings accumulated by the corporation since the death of the
testator, 9s and consequently such dividends are presumptively income. 99
The remaindermen have the burden of proving either that the extraordinary
dividend was not in fact paid from earnings, or that the entire dividend cannot be awarded to income without impairing the intact value of the shares.10 0
95. Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. at 46o, 179 Atl. at 732.
96. Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. at 462, 179 Atl. at 732. A corporate reorganization involving the creation of two new corporations, a holding company and an operating company, and an exchange of the trustee's shares for the shares of the holding company,
is an unusual circumstance. Daily's Estate, 323 Pa. 42, 186 At. 754 (1936).
97. Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. at 464, 179 Atl. at 734; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,
§ 236 (a), comments i to k. But cf. Given's Estate, 323 Pa. at 46o, 185 AtL. at 780.
98. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. at 574, 181 Atl. at 568.
99. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 428, 162 Atl. at 296; Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. at
446, 154 Atl. at 815; Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. at 439, 146 AtI. at 112; Nirdlinger's Estate,
290 Pa. at 478, 139 Ati. at 208; McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. at 86, io6 Atl. at 191; Stokes's
Estate (No. i), 24o Pa. 277, 283, 87 Atl. 971, 973; Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. at 152, 73 Atl. at
323; Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368; cf. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236 (b), which apparently nega-

tives this presumption.
ioo. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 429, 162 Atl. at 296; Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. at
446, 154 Atl. at 815; McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. at 86, io6 Atl. at 191-192; Stokes's Estate
(No. i), 24o Pa. at 283, 87 Atl. at 973; Boyer's Appeal,

Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368; cf.
the burden of proof.

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,

224

Pa. at 152, 73 Atl. at 323;

§ 236 (b), which apparently reverses
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If the remaindermen can successfully meet the burden of proof which
is imposed upon them, the court will award to corpus such portion of the
extraordinary dividend which may be shown necessary to preserve the intact
value of the original shares. 10 1 And the court will likewise award to corpus
any portion of the dividend which has been paid out of increased capital
assets as distinguished from earnings, 10 2 irrespective of any question of the
impairment of intact value.
These rules relating to extraordinary dividends apply whether the dividend was paid in cash, 10 3 shares of stock of the same corporation, 10 4 shares
of stock of another corporation, 10 5 scrip or dividend obligations, 0 6 or
liberty bonds. 10 7 The form of the dividend is immaterial. In a few cases
the corporation, instead of declaring a stock dividend, has declared an extraordinary cash dividend and at the same time given the shareholders the
right to subscribe to additional shares in an amount exactly equal to the
extraordinary cash dividend. This kind of a transaction is in substance a
08
stock dividend and is treated accordingly by the courts.1
In all of the foregoing instances, the court has been dealing with cases
where the trustee held shares of common stock. At first sight it would
seem that no such questions would arise where the trustee holds shares of
preferred stock, paying dividends at a specified rate and at fixed intervals.
Nevertheless, we may expect that the courts will soon be called upon to deal
with a type of case of which the writer knows of only two examples in
jurisdictions applying the Pennsylvania rules, neither of these cases being a
decision of the court of last resort.
ioi.
445, 154
283 Pa.
Keown's

Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 428, 162 At!. at 296; Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. at
Atl. at 8,5; Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. at 478, 139 At!. at 208; Flaccus's Estate,
at 194, 129 At!. at 77; Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. at 494, 124 Atl. at 167; McEstate, 263 Pa. at 86, io6 Atl. at 192; Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278, 105 Atl. 273

(1918) ; Sloan's Estate, 258 Pa. 368, lO2 Atl. 31 (1917) ; Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368.
1O2. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 428, 162 Atl. at 296; Chatmcey's Estate, 303 Pa. at

447, 154 Atl. at 815; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236 (f) and comment z.
103. Mandeville's Estate, 286 Pa. 368, 133 Atl. 562; Thompson's Estate, 153 Pa.

332, 26
At!. 653; Smith's Estate, 14o Pa. 344, 21 Atl. 438; Oliver's Estate, 136 Pa. 43, 2o Atl. 527;

Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434;

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,

§ 236 (b) and comment s.

104. Flinn's Estate, 32o Pa. 15, 181 Atl. 492; Bullitt's Esiate, 308 Pa. 413, 162 Atl. 288;

Chauncey's Estate, 3o3 Pa. 441, 154 At. 814; Maris's Estate, 3O Pa. 2o, 151 Atl. 577; Packer's Estate (No. I), 291 Pa. 194, 139 Atl. 867; Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352;

Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. 186, 131 Atl. 714; Harkness's Estate, 283 Pa. 464, 129 Atl. 458;
Wittmer's Estate, 283 Pa. 311, 129 Atl. 85; Flaccus's Estate, 283 Pa. 185, 129 Atl. 74; Sloan's
Estate, 258 Pa. 368, 1O2 Atl. 31; Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368; Phila. Trust, Safe Deposit and
Ins. Company's Appeal, 24 W. N. Cas. 137, 16 Atl. 734; Willcox's Estate, 66 Pa. Super. Ct.
182; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236 (b) and comment it.
1o5. Eisner's Appeal, 175 Pa. 143, 34 Atl. 577; RESTATEMENT,

TRUSTS,

§ 236 (b) and com-

ment t.

io6. Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144, 73 Atl. 320; Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481, 67 At!.
775; Phila. Trust, Safe Deposit and Ins. Company's Appeal, 24 W. N. Cas. 137, 16 Atl. 734
(1889) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236 (b) and comment t.
107. Waterman's Estate, 279 Pa. 491, 124 Atl. 166.
io8. Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278, lO5 At!. 273; Stokes's Estate (No. i), 24o Pa. 277,
87 Atl. 971; Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 Atl. 438.
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Suppose that the trustee holds shares of cumulative preferred stock,
on which a large amount of unpaid back dividends have accrued. If the
corporation then becomes prosperous and pays off the back dividends, the
question will arise as to whether these payments are income or principal.
In this connection it must be noted that the back dividends may have accrued before the death of the testator or after, or partly both. They may
be paid off from earnings accumulated by the corporation before or after
the death of the testator, or both. Moreover, the back dividends may have
accrued in whole or in part during a preceding life estate and may have
been paid in whole or in part from earnings accumulated by the corporation
during such preceding life estate.
As might be expected, jurisdictions following the so-called "Massachusetts rule" base the result upon the medium of payment and the back
dividends are either income or principal depending upon whether they
are paid in cash or in shares of stock. 10 9 However, even in Massachusetts
the unpaid dividends accrued at the death of the testator are not regarded
as a chose in action which became a part of the principal of the estate. 110
This would seem a correct application of the well settled rule that a
preferred shareholder is not a creditor of the corporation.,-" Consequently,
the back dividends accrued at the death of the testator should not be treated
as a part of the intact value if, indeed, a preferred stock can be said to have
any intact value. The cumulative feature of preferred stock is simply a
prior right to receive income. It should not determine the allocation of that
income when received by a trustee.
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts has adopted the rule that all
payments of back preferred dividends are income to be awarded to the
person at that time entitled to receive the income of the trust estate," 2 provided only that they are paid out of earnings. It makes no difference when
the back dividends accrued or when the earnings were accumulated. The
Restatement treats all such payments as "ordinary" dividends, and if this
is correct, the result is in accord with our general rule that, except in cases
governed by Section 22 of the Fiduciaries Act, ordinary dividends are not
apportionable but belong entirely to the life beneficiary. 1113
The rule adopted by the Restatement is apparently based entirely upon
Thompson v. New York Trust Co. 1 4 In that case back dividends on preferred shares were paid out of earnings accumulated by the corporation
io9. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Adams, 219 Mass. 175, 1o6 N. E. 590 (1914);
Coolidge v. Grant, 251 Mass. 352, 146 N. E. 719 (925).
no. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Adams, 219 Mass. at i77, io6 N. E. at 591.
iii. Mitchell v. Liberty Clay Products Co., 291 Pa. 282, 290, 139 Ati. 853, 855 (1927).
112. Section 236, comments o and p.
113. See cases collected supra note 92.

114. 107 N. Y. Misc. 245, 177 N. Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct. igig), aff'd without opinion, i91
App. Div. 9o4, i8r N. Y. Supp. 956 (Ist Dep't, 192o).
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prior to the creation of the trust. It is not clear when the back dividends
accrued but apparently they accrued both prior to and subsequent to the
creation of the trust. Notwithstanding the source of the fund from which
the back dividends were paid, the court held that they were entirely the
property of the life beneficiary. The result may be attributable in part to
the language of the deed of trust which expressly directed that "dividends"
be paid to the life beneficiary. However, the case cannot be summarily
dismissed on this hypothesis because the court was professedly applying the
Pennsylvania rule, which had been adopted by the court of appeals. 115 In
doing so, the court treated the dividend as "ordinary" and, therefore, not
subject to apportionment.
So far as is known, the problem has been considered to date in only
one Pennsylvania decision. 116 That case was the audit, by the Orphans'
Court of Delaware County, of the second trustees' account in the Estate of
John P. Crozer.11 7 There the corporation paid back dividends, most or all
of which accrued prior to the death of the testator, out of earnings accumulated by the corporation thereafter. The auditing judge, in a carefully reasoned adjudication, followed the Thompson case and the Restatement and held that the dividend payments were income, awarding them to
the life beneficiaries. This decision was accepted by the parties.
The suspension of preferred dividends, caused by the business depression, has laid the foundation for numerous cases which will doubtless come
before the courts in due course. The strongest case for the life beneficiary
will be presented where the back dividends accrued subsequent to the death
of the testator and were paid from earnings which also were accumulated
subsequent to the death of the testator. The strongest case for the remainderman will be presented where the back dividends accrued prior to
the death of the testator and were paid from earnings which were accumulated prior to the death of the testator. Thompson v. New York Trust
Co."38 presents very nearly the latter situation, but nevertheless the divi-

dends were awarded entirely to the life beneficiary. Crozer's Estate 119
is an intermediate case because the back dividends were paid from earnings
of the corporation accumulated after the death of the testator. Innumerable
other intermediate cases can be readily imagined and will doubtless occur.
Until the supreme court shall have passed upon this problem, doubt and
difference of opinion will exist. Meanwhile, it can be said only that the
N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723 (1913).
i16. It was not considered in Given's Estate, 323 Pa. 456, 185 Atl. 778 (1936), in which
back dividends were declared and paid after the death of the life beneficiary. The court
awarded them to the remaindermen but the result was based upon the language of the will.
117. 27 D. & Co. 179 (Orph. Ct. Del. Co. 1936).
118. 107 N. Y. Misc. 245, 177 N. Y. Supp. 299, aff'd without opinion, 191 App. Div. 904,
181 N. Y. Supp. 956.
119. 27 D. & C. 179 (Orph. Ct. Del. Co. 1936).
115. Matter of Osborne, 209
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rule of the Restatement, which seems to be theoretically sound, is supported
by the few existing authorities and thus far has been followed in all cases
where it was called to the attention of the lower courts.
DISTRIBUTIONS IN LIQUIDATION

The purpose of payments in liquidation is, of course, to distribute to
the shareholders the entire assets of the corporation which remain after the
payment of debts. These payments represent not only the earnings which
the corporation has accumulated since the death of the testator but also the
capital assets which the corporation owned at that time, together with any
enhanced value that may be realized thereon.
It was recognized at a comparatively early date that the life beneficiary
should receive such portion of the proceeds of a corporate liquidation as is
actually a distribution of earnings accumulated by the corporation since the
death of the testator. 120 But, by reason of the nature of distributions in
liquidation, there can scarcely be any presumption that the corporation is
distributing merely its earnings. Consequently, the burden rests upon the
life beneficiary to prove the amount of such accumulated earnings' 2 1 and
only to the extent that he does so will he participate in a distribution in
liquidation. 1 22 Logically, he ought also to prove that the particular earnings are actually represented in a particular payment. However, this would
be an impossible burden, and accordingly, if the life beneficiary proves that
earnings to the extent of a certain sum per share have been accumulated
since the death of the testator, he will receive that sum out of the first payment, if the intact value will not be impaired thereby. 2 3
The foregoing rules apply to a partial 124 as well as to a total liquidation. They likewise apply to a transaction which is in substance a liquidation of the corporation although, perhaps, not technically a liquidation in
form.

125

i20. Connolly's Estate (No. 1), 198 Pa. 137, 47 Atl. 1125 (i9o) ; McKeown's Estate,
263 Pa. 78, 86, io6 Atl. 18g, 192 (1919) ; McCahan's Estate, 18 D. & C. 17I (Orph. Ct. Phila.
1932), rev'd on other points, 312 Pa. 515, 168 Atl. 685 (1933); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS,
§236 (d), comment X.
121. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. at 86, io6 Atl. at 192; McCahan's Estate, 18 Pa. D. &
C. 17I, rev'd on other Points, 312 Pa. 515, 168 Atl. 685.
122. Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434 (1882), and cases collected supra note 12o.
123. All of our cases proceed on the theory that the most recently acquired earnings are
first paid out by the corporation. Unfortunately, no case can be cited in which this theory is
expressly recognized.
124. Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236 (d), comment z.
125. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. at 83, 84, 86, io6 Atl. at 191, 192, in which case the trus-

tee, who held shares of stock of corporation A, sold his shares to corporation B, which had
purchased all the assets of corporation A. The court held that the transaction was, in substance, a liquidation of corporation A. See also Daily's Estate, 323 Pa. 42, I86 Atl. 754
(1936), where the trustee exchanged his shares for the shares of a new holding company
which owned all the shares of a new operating company to which the assets of the original
corporation had been transferred.
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MERGERS

It frequently happens that two or more corporations, in one of which
the trustee is a shareholder, enter into a merger, and the trustee thereupon
exchanges his shares for shares in a new corporation. If the trustee receives the same number of shares of new stock in exchange, the life beneficiary has no right to an apportionment, even though the book value of the
new shares exceeds the intact value of the original shares. 126 In such a
case there can be no apportionment until the new corporation declares an
extraordinary cash or stock dividend, or is liquidated, or until the trustee
121
sells the new shares at a price which reflects the increased book value.
If, however, the trustee receives in exchange a greater number of shares
of the new corporation, it has been held by a lower court that the excess
constitutes a distribution in the nature of an extraordinary dividend and
should, therefore, be awarded to the life beneficiary under the rules which
govern such dividends.'

28

RIGHTS TO SUBSCRIBE

Prior to 1928 there was considerable conflict and uncertainty among
the decisions dealing with rights to subscribe, a fact of which the courts
had become well aware. 1 9 In that year, the supreme court laid down the
rules which apply when the trustee receives rights to subscribe and exercises
them.130 In 1932 the court considered the rules which apply if the trustee,
instead of exercising the rights, sells them. 1 1 The difference lies in the
burden of proof, but that, of -course, is an extremely important difference.
If the trustee exercised the rights and subscribed to new shares by a
payment made from corpus, the intact value of the investment is the intact
value of the original shares plus the purchase price of the new shares.' 32
Enough of the shares, at their then book value, are awarded to corpus to
preserve the intact value thus ascertained, and the balance of the shares are
awarded to the life beneficiary.' 3 3 The presumption is that the shares in
excess of the number required to preserve the intact value represent earnings
126. Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 147 AtI.

Phila.

6o6

(1929), aff'g, 12 D. & C. I59 (Orph. Ct.

1929).

127. Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. at 543, 147 Atl. at 6o8.

128. Graham's Estate, io D. & C. 695 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1928), aff'd, 296 Pa. 436, 146 At.
II (1929) (the point now under discussion was not passed upon by the supreme court). The
view of the court below is supported by the reasoning in Daily's Estate, 323 Pa. 42, 186 Atl.
754 (1936), where additional shares received in a reincorporation were apportioned.
129. For discussions of the conflicting decisions, see Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. at 466,
139 AtI. at 203-204, and the adjudication of the late Judge Gest in Corr's Estate, 29 Dist. Rep.
281 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1920).
130. Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. at 153, 14o Ati. at 863.
131. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. 422, 162 Atl. 295.
132. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. 572, 181 Atl. 567.
133. Ibid.; Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. at 153, 14o Atl. at 863.
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The
accumulated by the corporation since the death of the testator. 13
burden is upon the remainderman to prove the contrary.
If, however, the trustee sells the rights instead of exercising them, the
proceeds are presumptively principal. The burden of proof rests upon the
life beneficiary, and he is entitled to receive only such part of the proceeds
as he proves to be attributable to accumulated earnings. 3 5 He cannot, of
course, receive any portion attributable to increases of capital assets or to
the speculative value, enhanced market value or earning power of the
13
stock.
It is difficult to see why the burden of proof should differ in these cases.
The substance of the transaction is that the trustee received rights to subscribe, and the burden of proof should not depend merely upon what the
trustee does with them. All of the advances made by the recent decisions
are based upon the rule that the rights of the parties depend upon the substance of the transaction and not upon its mere form. It is therefore unfortunate that there should be this apparent difference in the burden of
proof, based not upon substance but upon form. Perhaps future decisions
will make it clear that no such distinction is intended.
In passing, it should be repeated that the declaration of a dividend
coupled with the right to use the dividend to purchase new shares is regarded
as being in substance a stock dividend. 13 7 It therefore would seem to be
governed by the rules relating to extraordinary dividends, rather than by the
rules governing rights to subscribe.
The recent rules which have just been discussed have rendered obsolete
a number of earlier cases. It will be not unprofitable to consider the earlier
cases briefly for the purpose of determining which of them are still in
apparent good standing.
A leading early case held that rights to subscribe to shares of the same
corporation were principal as a matter of law, whether the rights were
exercised or sold. 138 Although this is the rule which has been adopted by
the Restatement of the Law of Trusts,139 it is no longer the law of Pennsylvania. Equally obsolete are cases indicating that the proceeds of rights
140
are income as a matter of law.
134. Hostetter's Trust, 319 Pa. at 574, I81 Atl. at 568.
135. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 43o, 162 AtI. at 297; Biddle's Appeal, 9_ Pa. 278
(1882) ; cf. Noblit's Estate, 15 D. & C. 202 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1931) ; Burton's Estate, 12 D. &

C. 605 (Orph. Ct. Phila.

1929).

136. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 430, 162 Atl. at 297.
137. See cases collected mtpra note io8.
138. Eisner's Appeal, 175 Pa. 143, 34 Atl. 577. Cf. Moss's Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (1877);
Corr's Estate, 29 Pa. D. R. 281 (1920). In Veech's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 373 (1920), the

same rule was applied to rights to subscribe to shares of preferred stock of the same corporation.
139. Section 236 (c) and comment w.

140. Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256 (I87O).
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However, the problem of rights to subscribe to the shares of another
corporation does not appear to be touched by the recent cases. Suppose the
trustee holds shares of Corporation A and thereby receives rights to subscribe to shares (or bonds) of Corporation B. In such a case it has been
held that the rights,1 41 or the profit on the shares acquired by their exercise, 142 are income as a matter of law. 143 It can be strongly argued that
these cases are still good law. The intact value of the shares of Corporation
A would not seem to be affected, unless Corporation B was its subsidiary
and the issuance of the rights would decrease the book value of the shares
of Corporation B, which were among the assets of Corporation A. On the
other hand, it may be argued that the rights can scarcely be considered a
distribution of earnings on the part of Corporation A, whose shares the
trustee holds, and therefore the life beneficiary is not entitled to them.
All of the foregoing occasions for apportionment were created by
events which took place wholly within the corporation whose shares were
held by the trustee. However, an apportionment may be made necessary
by certain events which take place wholly or principally within the trust
estate.
PROCEEDS OF SALES OF SHARES OF STOCK

Prior to 1927 it was generally considered to be the law that there could
be no occasion for apportionment without some act on the part of the corporation which amounted to a distribution of earnings. 14 4 However, a sale
by the trustee was considered to require an apportionment where the sale
was in substance a liquidation of the corporation. 145 It represented but a
slight step forward to consider an ordinary sale in the market as being a
liquidation, at least of the holding of the trustee.1 46
However, as in the case of a true liquidation, 117 the proceeds of a sale
of the shares are prima facie principal 148 because there is no express or
implied declaration by the corporation that they represent earnings. The
141. Eisner's Appeal, 175 Pa. 143, 34 Atl. 577; cf. Thomson's Estate, 153 Pa. at 339, 26
Atl. at 653.
142. Kemble's Estate, 2O Pa. 523, 525, 51 Atl. 310, 311 (1902) ; Wiltbank's Appeal, 64
Pa. 256 (i87O).

143. See cases collected supra notes 141, 142. Contra: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236 (c)
and comment w.
144. Accord: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236 (e) and comment y. See also Kemble's Estate, 201 Pa. 523, 51 Atl. 310, in which an exchange of shares of stock was treated as a mere
sale, giving the life beneficiary no rights in the proceeds.
145. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, io6 Atl. 189 (sale for cash) ; Daily's Estate, 323 Pa.
42, I86 Atl. 754 (exchange of shares). It makes no difference whether the trustee sells for
cash or for shares of stock of the other corporation.
146. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 2oo; the Restatement refused to take
this step. See § 236 and comment y.
147. McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. at 86, io6 Atl. at 192; McCahan's Estate, I8 Pa. D. &
C. 7I, rev'd on other points, 312 Pa. 515, 168 Atl. 685.
148. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 429, 162 Atl. at 296; Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa; at
475-476, I39 Atl. at 207.
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and
burden of proof on this point, therefore, is upon the life beneficiary,
easy
one.
means
an
it is by no
First, he must prove the intact value of the shares, in accordance with
the principles already discussed at length. This much is set aside at once
as principal, but it does not follow that the balance of the proceeds will be
awarded to the life beneficiary. He cannot be awarded any portion of such
excess unless he can also prove that it represents earnings of the corporation,
accumulated since the death of the testator. Even though the proceeds may
be in excess of the intact value, they may reflect merely increased market
value due to the increased earning power of the corporation, or to the expectation of dividends, or to the speculative value of the shares or the
"good-will" of the corporation. Any such portion of the proceeds is principal. 150 Nor is the life beneficiary entitled to the amount by which the
151
He
proceeds exceed the book value of the shares at the time of sale.
must earmark definitely the portion of the proceeds which represents earnings accumulated since the death of the testator. To the extent that this
52
can be awarded to him without impairing the intact value, he will get it.'
In theory, it is assumed that if there are such earnings, and the proceeds are sufficient in amount to cover them, the earnings are actually reflected in the proceeds of the sale. It would be impossible for the life beneficiary to prove that the shares brought $150 per share because of the existence of an earned surplus of $50 per share. Last month the price might
have been only $IOO per share, and if the trustee sold at that time the life
beneficiary would get nothing, even though the accumulated earnings existed. Next month the price may be $200 per share, and if the trustee sells
them the life beneficiary will still get only $50. Actually, market price has
little or no relation to accumulated earnings. 1 53 The rights of the life
beneficiary, therefore, depend to a greater or less extent upon a fortuitous
sale by the trustee at a time when the proceeds will be sufficient in amount
to allow him to receive a portion equal to the amount of the accumulated
1 54
earnings.
It does not follow, however, that our courts are wrong in giving the
life beneficiary rights which before he did not possess and which the Restate149.

Ibid.

I5O. Waterhouse's Estate, 3o8 Pa. at 429, 162 At. at 296; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. at
476, 479, 139 Atl. at 207, 2o8.
151. See McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. at 83, io6 AtI. at i9o.
152. Waterhouse's Estate, 308 Pa. at 429, 162 Atl. at 297; Packer's Estate (No. 1), 291
Pa. at 196-197, 139 AtI. 867; Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. at 475-476, 139 Atl. at 2o8.
153. This is made clear by a comparison of the market prices of the shares of such
standard railroads as Norfolk & Western, during the past three or four years, with the book
values of their shares, as shown by their balance sheets.
154. Obviously, a rule which makes the rights of the life beneficiary depend on the action
or inaction of others should be avoided, if possible. Yates's Estate, 281 Pa. 178, 182, 126 AUt.
254, 255 (924).
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meit of the Law of Trusts does not now give him. 155 The life beneficiary
is, after all, usually the primary object of the bounty of the creator of the
trust and, as such, he should be favored. 150 By giving him a chance at least
to recover accumulated earnings, our rule works substantial, albeit sometimes rough, justice.
TERMINATION

OF THE TRUST

In Daily's Estate 157 the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia held that the
termination of the trust was a proper occasion for apportioning shares then
held by the trustee in order to give the estate of the life beneficiary all earnings which the corporation had accumulated since the death of the testator
but which had not been distributed. This is directly contrary to the view
approved by the supreme court in Connolly's Estate (No. i),158 althouglh
that case might, perhaps, be distinguished on the ground that there was no
evidence upon which an apportionment could have been based.
When Daily's Estate came before the supreme court, 159 that court rejected the view of the orphans' court without, however, citing the previous
decision. To make it clear that the position of the court below was actually
rejected, a full statement of the facts is necessary. The trust was created in
1913, and among the assets were 200 shares of stock of an Illinois corporation. In 193o a Maryland corporation was formed as an operating company, and a Delaware corporation was formed as a holding company. In
exchange for his 200 shares of the Illinois corporation, the trustee, in 1930,
received 8oo shares of common stock and iooo shares of preferred stock
of the Delaware corporation. In 1934 the -life beneficiary died, and the
trust terminated. The court below apportioned the trustee's holdings in
such a manner as to give the estate of the life beneficiary all of the accumulated earnings of this enterprise from 1913 down to 1934. The supreme
court, however, held that the exchange which took place in 1930 was in
substance a sale or liquidation and directed an apportionment as of that date.
In doing so, the estate of the life beneficiary received so much of the new
shares as represented earnings accumulated from 1913 to 193o, and the
balance, namely, 503 shares of preferred and 402 shares of common stock,
was awarded to the remaindermen. These latter shares, which were awarded
to the remaindermen, obviously carried with them undistributed earnings
accumulated by the corporation from 1930 to the death of the life beneSee supra note 146.
156. Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa. at 459, 179 Atl. at 732.
157. 24 D. & C. 628 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1935).
158. 198 Pa. 137, 47 AtI. 1125 (19o)
(recently said by the supreme court to be of doubtful authority). See Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. at 475, 139 Atl. at 207. Accord: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236 (e).
159. 323 Pa. 42, 186 Atl. 754 (1936).
155.
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ficiary in 1934, a period during which he was entitled to the income of the
estate. It was these earnings which the court below, by treating the termination of the trust as an occasion for an apportionment, awarded to the
estate of the life beneficiary, and it was this result which the supreme court
disapproved. In so doing the supreme court has reaffirmed Connolly's
Estate (No. T),160 and has decided that the termination of the trust does

not constitute'an occasion for apportionment. Connolly's Estate (No. I) is
simply an application of the older view, now discredited in this state, 161
that unless there is a distribution of some kind by the corporation itself,
there can be no apportionment.
Consequently, if a trustee holds shares for a long period during which
the corporation accumulates large amounts of undistributed earnings, such
earnings will be awarded to the life beneficiary if the trustee sells the
shares,' 6 2 but if the trustee holds the shares until the termination of the
trust, the life beneficiary will get nothing, and all of the undistributed
earnings accumulated during the period of the trust will pass to the remaindermen. It is to be hoped that when such a case is presented to the
supreme court, free from the complications present in Daily's Estate, the
view of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia will be adopted.
SUCCESSIVE LIFE BENEFICIARIES

The foregoing discussion concerns the rights of the life beneficiaries
as a group, on the one hand, and the rights of the remaindermen on the
other. A complication may arise where there are two or more successive
life beneficiaries, one of whom is deceased when the occasion for apportionment arises. For example, an extraordinary dividend received after the
death of the first life beneficiary may represent, in whole or in part, earnings
accumulated by the corporation during the first life estate. Such a case
presents a controversy between succeeding life beneficiaries.
Such a dividend is, of course, presumptively payable to the person
entitled to the income of the estate at the time the dividend is declared.' 6 3
Accordingly, the estate of the first life beneficiary has the burden of proving
how much of the dividend represents earnings accumulated by the corporation up to the date of his death.'0 4 However, if this burden is sustained,
the amount of such earnings will be awarded to the estate of the deceased
life beneficiary. 6 5
i6o.
I61.
162.
163.
164.
i65.

198 Pa. 137, 47 Atl. 1125 (ig0I).
Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. at 472, 139 Atl. at 206.
Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 2oo.
Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436, 146 Atl. i1 (1929).

Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. at 44o, 146 Atl. at 11.
Neafie's Estate, 25 D. & C. 6o8; Nirdlinger's Estate, 26 D. & C. 3, 15; Simpson's

Estate, 23 D. R. 27 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1913).

ment y.

Contra: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236, com-
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The same rules apply to the proceeds of a sale of shares after the death
of the first life beneficiary. 1 66 However, such proceeds are prima facie not
income at all. 16 7 Consequently, the efforts of the succeeding life beneficiary
to earmark the portion which represents earnings may inure to the benefit
of the estate of the first life beneficiary because, in proving that the corporation has accumulated earnings, it is impossible to avoid proving when
the earnings were accumulated.
6
Because of the provisions of Section 22 of the Fiduciaries Act,1 8
ordinary dividends must be apportioned between successive life beneficiaries
on a per day basis, as bond interest is apportioned. 6 9 This is the only
exception to the general rule that ordinary dividends are not apportionable
at all.' 70 With this exception, there is no occasion for an apportionment
between successive life beneficiaries except in connection with a similar
apportionment between life beneficiaries on the one hand and remaindermen
on the other.

171

THE DUTIES OF THE TRUSTEE

A trustee, and particularly a corporate fiduciary, must use the utmost
care in making allocations between income and principal, 172 and he is bound
by notices, given to the shareholders by the corporation, stating the source
of corporate distributions.' 73 If he overpays the life beneficiary, the trustee
will be surcharged.

1 74

Of course, he can avoid any such risk by filing his account and having
the court decide the question. Indeed, it is not only his right but also his
duty to file an account for this purpose. 7 5 Moreover, he should do so
promptly, for if he carries a stock dividend as a part of principal and later
it is determined that the shares should have been awarded to the life beneficiary, the trustee may be liable if, during his unreasonable delay in filing
an account, the shares have depreciated.1lO
However, not all cases involve sums sufficient to warrant the expense
of the counsel and guardian ad litem fees which would be incurred in the
filing and audit of an account. In such cases the trustee cannot be blamed
166. Neafie's Estate, 25 D. & C. 6o8. Contra: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 236, comment y.
167. Waterhouse's Estate, 3o8 Pa. at 429, 162 Atl. at 296; Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. at
475-476, i39 Atl. at 207.
i68. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 634.
I69. Opperman's Estate (No. 1), 319 Pa. 455, 179 Atl. 729; Given's Estate, 323 Pa. at
461, i85 Atl. at 780; Thompson's Estate, 6 D. & C. 503.
170. See cases collected supra note 92.
171. See Nirdlinger's Estate, 26 D. & C. at 13 et seq.
172. Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa. at 462, 179 Atl. at 733.
173. Opperman's Estate (No. I), 319 Pa. at 463, 179 Atl. at 734.
174. Vinton's Appeal, 99 Pa. 434.
175. Roberts's Estate, 2 D. & C. 667 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1923).
176. See Riger's Estate, 22 D. & C. 261 (Orph. Ct. Phila. 1934), in which, however, no
depreciation took place and the trustee escaped liability.
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if, instead of attempting to make an apportionment himself, he defers the
questions until the next accounting.
The trustee represents both the life beneficiary and the remainderman.
He represents one just as much as he does the other. When dealing with
receipts from shares of stock, he must not take sides between the life beneficiary and remainderman. 177 Accordingly, having filed his account, it
would be improper for him to assume that he is the advocate of the remainderman in the resulting litigation. In such a case the trustee's only
duty is to file his account with reasonable promptness and to see that all
parties have due notice and an opportunity to present their claims to the
court. This is not an intolerable burden. It is true that the Pennsylvania
rules of apportionment are not rules of convenience, but it would seem that
what inconvenience exists is cast upon the beneficiaries rather than upon the
trustee.
However this may be, "it seems like a bungling rule of law that, at
one time, would give what is undoubtedly income to the remaindermen, and,
at another, what is as clearly capital to the life tenant". 178 No such rule of
law should be adopted either by the courts or by the legislature merely to
make it easy for a trustee to perform duties for which he is adequately
compensated.
APPENDIX
For the convenience of those who may wish to examine all the cases for themselves, the

following list of cases in chronological order is suggested. It includes all important appellate
decisions bearing directly upon the subject, together with the citation to the report of each case
in the court below, if reported in a publication of general availability.
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